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O’Brien was a person who could be talked to. Perhaps one did 
not want to be loved so much as 
to be understood. O’Brien had tor-
tured him to the edge of lunacy, 
and in a little while, it was certain, 
he would send him to his death. It 
made no difference. In some sense 
that went deeper than friendship, 
they were intimates: somewhere or 
other, although the actual words 
might never be spoken, there was 
a place where they could meet and 
talk.
 —  George Orwell, 1984
The year 2016 was very difficult for 
labour rights in China. In order to 
support investments during a serious 
economic slowdown, local authori-
ties in several areas froze minimum 
wages and reduced the percentages 
of social security contributions shoul-
dered by companies. At the same time, 
officials in the highest echelons of the 
Party-state repeatedly criticised the 
existing labour legislation, in particu-
lar the 2008 Labour Contract Law 劳
动合同法, for harming the flexibility 
of the labour market and constraining 
productivity. All of this has translat-
ed into increased control over those 
Chinese labour activists who try to 
promote the cause of workers’ rights, 
as well as the foreign donors who 
support their activities. This has been 
achieved through several state bodies, 
including the State Security guobao 国
保 — a secretive branch of the Public 
Security apparatus charged with pro-
tecting the country from domestic po-
litical threats. 
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use a recorder? Writing down by hand 
all that was said was indeed a strenu-
ous job and, perhaps as a reward for 
his effort, he thought it fitting to invite 
himself to the restaurant for a post-in-
terview lunch — at my expense. 
My second brush with the State 
Security came some time later and it 
was much more worrying. While I was 
back in Italy for a few weeks, some 
guobao officials tracked down one of 
my former collaborators and interro-
gated him at length about my activities 
and whereabouts. I heard much later 
that they were particularly interest-
ed in how I spent money: did I often 
rent expensive cars? Did I throw mon-
ey around? He protested that I was so 
stingy that I always insisted on taking 
a bus, even when doing interviews in 
some faraway suburb — which was 
true — and the matter seemed to rest 
there. 
Being a foreigner, I had little rea-
son to fear the consequences of these 
encounters: at worst, they would deny 
me a visa or expel me from the coun-
try. But what about those Chinese la-
bour activists who have to deal with 
the security forces of the Chinese 
state on a regular basis? How do they 
manage?
At my first meeting with an agent 
of the State Security in December 
2010, I had gone to the office of a lit-
tle-known labour NGO in the suburbs 
of Shenzhen to interview some activ-
ists. When I arrived, I found a plump, 
bespectacled guy of around forty wait-
ing for me. Nobody thought about in-
troducing him and he definitely did 
not make an effort to make himself 
familiar: for me, he was only ‘Mister 
Wang’. Sitting in silence in a corner, he 
wrote down on a notebook everything 
I was saying. 
He was a very destabilising pres-
ence. Not only did I not know what I 
should say and what I should avoid, 
but I was also worried about the trou-
ble I might be causing for my hosts. 
Besides, I wondered, why did he not 
A candid shot of one of China’s mysterious guobao
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Sticks
As with other civil society activists, 
invitations to ‘have a cup of tea’ 喝茶 
with State Security officials are one of 
the most common occurrences in the 
life of a Chinese labour activist. The 
frequency of these summonses de-
pends on the political circumstances. It 
usually intensifies around the time of 
politically-sensitive meetings (such as 
the annual National People’s Congress 
in March every year); anniversaries 
(including both official ones, such as 
the foundation of the Communist Party 
and unofficial ones, such as 4 June); or 
major international events hosted in 
China. The frequency declines in more 
ordinary times, down to one meeting 
every several months.
These encounters generally do 
not entail physical violence. They 
serve a twofold purpose. On the one 
hand, officials seek information about 
the activities of labour NGOs: recent 
contacts with foreigners and any new 
sources of funding, for example. On 
the other, they use the meetings to 
warn, inform or remind activists about 
boundaries they must not cross if they 
want to avoid severe repercussions. 
From this point of view, these gather-
ings can be considered mutually ben-
eficial: the Party-state gets to remind 
labour activists that they are under 
surveillance, while activists benefit 
from a direct line to the authorities 
and are able to avoid unnecessary 
risks if their activities are too close 
to the limits of what is allowed. One 
labour activist in East China told me 
that when he set up his organisation 
‘[the people from the State Security] 
came to me several times. First, they 
established a baseline and a frame-
work, warning me to stay within these 
boundaries. They said that if I did that, 
all would be good, that I would even be 
helping the government and the coun-
try. If, on the contrary, I crossed that 
line, for instance by telling foreigners 
some things that I shouldn’t say about 
our country or our government … that 
would have meant real trouble.’ 
Have a cup of tea
Photo: Matthew Wild, Flickr
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Still, the messages relayed by the 
authorities are not always reliable. For 
instance, in 2015, a labour activist in a 
metropolis in South China decided to 
test the claim of the guobao that his 
activities would be tolerated so long as 
he did not accept any foreign funding. 
This is what he found out: ‘[They] had 
told me that we could work on protect-
ing the rights of workers and that we 
could organise training on collective 
bargaining, but that we could not re-
ceive funding from abroad. They said 
that foreigners have a different way 
of thinking, that if they say something, 
they actually mean something else, 
and that they could easily manipulate 
me … . They said that if we didn’t take 
any funding from abroad our situation 
would be better, that they would stop 
harassing me. I decided that this year 
[2015] I would try and see whether 
they were serious. In January, I sus-
pended this project [supported with 
foreign funding], but in these first six 
months I have already been forced 
to move [office] three times.’ In light 
of this, he decided to resume his co- 
operation with foreign donors.
Whatever assurances the State 
Security might provide in individu-
al meetings, these encounters do not 
always go smoothly, as the highest 
echelons of the Party-state tend to con-
sider labour NGOs as covert agents of 
‘hostile foreign forces’ eager to wreak 
havoc in China. Although largely pre- 
dating the latest change of leader-
ship, this narrative has gained much 
more currency since Xi Jinping came 
to power. According to one activist 
whom I interviewed back in 2014 in a 
second-tier city in Guangdong prov-
ince: ‘After President Xi came to 
power, the management and control of 
NGOs has become increasingly strict. 
Zeng Feiyang
Photo: Trong Khiem Nguyen, Flickr
Recently, people from Public Securi-
ty came to meet with us. They asked 
what our political standpoint was  and 
said that all the “coloured revolutions” 
abroad were instigated by NGOs and 
then they asked our opinion about it. 
I replied that we don’t pay too much 
attention to this [sort of thing].’
Mounting Pressures
Agents from State Security may also re-
sort to psychological intimidation and 
other tactics to persuade labour ac-
tivists to cease their work. In the past 
few years, guobao officials have re-
peatedly pressured landlords to evict 
NGOs from their premises. They have 
also liaised with other branches of the 
Party-state — such as those in charge 
of family planning, tax or social secu-
rity bureaus, as well as universities, 
etc. — to harass the activists and their 
families. They have even intervened 
behind the scenes to freeze bank ac-
counts or prevent people from leaving 
the country. As an activist in southern 
China told me in November 2014: ‘In 
the past, they didn’t provoke us, nor 
did we provoke them. Basically, what 
we had back then could not even be 
called repression. Usually, they just 
knew about the existence of our or-
ganisation and there were often peo-
ple from the government who came to 
talk with us … . But these last few years 
have been quite different, they have 
started to harass us directly.’
While life for Chinese labour ac-
tivists has never been easy, 2016 has 
been a real annus horribilis for them. 
The latest wave of repression start-
ed in December 2015, when Chinese 
authorities rounded up dozens of la-
bour activists in Guangdong and then 
charged five of them for ‘gathering 
a crowd to disrupt public order’ and 
‘embezzlement’. This coincided with 
a systematic harassment of  Chinese 
civil society, with the closure of many 
NGOs working on social issues, and 
the arrest or outright disappearance 
of several public interest lawyers. On 
that occasion, the Party-state targeted 
Zeng Feiyang 曾飞洋 — leader of a pi-
oneering labour NGO in Guangzhou — 
in an unprecedented smear campaign. 
A series of devastating reports accused 
Zeng of embezzling funding illegally 
obtained from foreigners and of acting 
out of personal greed, without any re-
gard for the interests of the workers. 
To further destroy his credibility, he 
was also accused of several instances 
of sexual misconduct.1 
Zeng pleaded guilty and was sen-
tenced to three years in prison — sus-
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pended for four years — for ‘gather-
ing a crowd to disrupt public order’, 
while two of his colleagues received 
prison sentences of eighteen months 
— suspended for two years — for the 
same crime. Meng Han 孟晗, another 
activist in the same organisation, re-
fused to co-operate. Only after repeat-
ed harassment of his parents did he 
finally capitulate and plead guilty, and 
was sentenced to twenty-one months 
in jail. Zeng’s admission of guilt at the 
trial was quoted in full by the Chinese 
media: ‘I apologise for the losses that 
my criminal actions have caused to 
companies, society, and workers, and I 
express deep sorrow for the enormous 
wounds that I have inflicted on my 
family. I hope that everybody will take 
me as a warning and that they will not 
be fooled by any foreign organisation, 
[keeping in mind] that they must re-
sort to legal means and channels to 
protect their rights and interests.’2 
Carrots
The relationship between labour activ-
ists and their controllers is not always 
so thorny. I recall my surprise when, 
about five years ago, an activist I used 
to know quite well told me that while 
he was recovering from surgery, the 
State Security official in charge of him 
had visited him in the hospital. Wish-
ing him a speedy recovery, the guobao 
had brought him flowers and they had 
engaged in amiable conversation. The 
activist explained that, since this offi-
cial had been his ‘supervisor’ for quite 
some time, they had become almost 
friends, regularly exchanging greet-
ings and wishes on all major Chinese 
festivals. 
Such ambiguous feelings are not 
surprising considering that some ac-
tivists are supervised by the same of-
ficials for years. The relationship may 
also offer some perks. As one activist in 
southern China recently told me: ‘We 
can say that they are old acquaintanc-
es… . On the surface they are friend-
ly, but in fact we don’t really know 
what they think about us, we just tell 
Meng Han: twenty-one month sentence
Source: Twitter
them what we have to … . Sometimes 
they also offer us some gifts [such as 
shopping coupons], which obviously 
we don’t accept … . But it seems that in 
recent years they have become poorer, 
they don’t have as much money as be-
fore.’
In some cases, less scrupulous ac-
tivists have exploited their connections 
to the State Security as leverage in 
their relationship with foreign donors. 
In 2009 and 2010, I was working as a 
manager on a project in partnership 
with a local labour NGO that turned 
out to be quite notorious for its record 
of fake activities and inflated invoices. 
When I refused to reimburse an obvi-
ously dodgy expenditure, the leader 
of the NGO hinted that he would say 
something rather unpleasant about 
me in his next meeting with the au-
thorities. On another occasion, some-
one who had been fired from the same 
organisation decided to seek compen-
sation directly from the foreign donor, 
threatening to talk with his ‘friends’ in 
the security apparatus if he did not get 
what he wanted.
What Next?
Control over NGOs is increasing, as is 
repression, and this extends to foreign-
ers who are involved with them. In 
the past couple of years, a few expats 
in China with ties to foreign and local 
NGOs have been detained, with one of 
them — Peter Dahlin, a Swedish citizen 
— even being paraded on national tel-
evision in early 2016, confessing to in-
citing ‘opposition to the government.’ 
But it is Chinese activists who bear 
the brunt of the Party-state’s ire. La-
bour activists, as well as human rights 
lawyers, are among those most at risk 
in the current political climate. Even 
more worrying than brutal repression 
is the recent adoption of a whole series 
of new laws and regulations aimed at 
bringing civil society under control. 
Most notably among these is the new 
Law on the Management of Foreign 
NGOs’ Activities 境外非政府组织境
内活动管理法, effective from 1 Janu-
ary 2017, which will basically cut off 
any access to financial support from 
abroad for NGOs active in sensitive 
fields such as labour or human rights. 
Peter Dahlin during his televised confession
Source: YouTube
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Almost all the labour activists 
that I have encountered in the past 
few months say that they are willing 
to keep up the fight, undeterred. At 
the same time, however, they cannot 
help but wonder how they will be able 
to survive as their sources of financial 
support quickly dry up and even find-
ing enough money to pay their staff or 
the office rent becomes increasingly 
problematic. A few months ago, for 
the first time in many years of regular 
encounters with labour activists, I was 
asked by the leader of a once-prom-
inent NGO, now in serious financial 
constraints, to help by sending some 
funding — ‘really, any amount counts’ 
— to an account opened under the 
name of one of his friends. If this is 
going to be the ‘new normal’ during Xi 
Jinping’s tenure, then activists might 
start reminiscing about the golden age 
when the most that State Security did 
was to invite you for a cup of tea. 
This text is taken from China Story Yearbook 2016: Control, 
edited by Jane Golley, Linda Jaivin and Luigi Tomba, published 2017 by 
ANU Press, The Australian National University, Canberra, Australia.
